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Abstract This article is on a precise kind of color primitivism, ‘ostensivism.’ This is
the view that it is in the nature of the colors that they are phenomenal, non-reductive,
structural, categorical properties. First, I differentiate ostensivism from other precise
forms of primitivism. Next, I examine the core belief ‘Revelation,’ and propose a
revised version, which, unlike standard statements, is compatible with a yet unstated
but plausible core belief: roughly, that there are interesting things to be discovered
about the nature of the colors. Finally, I show that ostensivism is the only view on
color that can accommodate both proposed core beliefs.
Keywords Color · Phenomenal · Core beliefs · Color primitivism · Revelation ·
Realism · Relationalism · Objectivism · Anti-relationalism
1 Introduction
Views on what the colors are can be divided into two categories: reductive and non-
reductive. There are many precise reductive views. Appearance dispositionalism is a
reductive view to the effect that the colors are dispositions to appear certain ways if
certain generally specified conditions are met; for example, red is the disposition to
appear red to a normal subject if viewed in normal circumstances (McGinn 1983; John-
ston 1992; Levin 2000). Another reductive view is ‘micro-structuralism:’ the colors
are micro-structural properties (Smart 1963; Armstrong 1968), for example, having
a certain electronic configuration. A more contemporary challenger is ‘reflectance
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dispositionalism:’ the colors are dispositions to reflect certain proportions of incident
light at each wavelength of the visible spectrum (Tye 2000; Byrne and Hilbert 2003,
2004). Finally, there is Cohen’s relational view (2004, 2009), which, like the above
views, is reductive (see for example, Cohen 2009, p. 10, footnote 16). His relational
view is that the colors are reductively constituted by relations to subjects.
Compared to reductive views, there is a paucity of precise, non-reductive, also called
‘primitivist,’ views. Many statements of primitivism are vague or unclear (Campbell
1993; Yablo 1995; McGinn 1996; Chalmers 2006). I develop a precise version of
primitivism, ‘ostensivism,’ designed to better accommodate certain core beliefs. First,
I explain ostensivism in detail (Sect. 2), clarifying how it is different from other
precise primitivist views. I then examine the well-known core belief, ‘Revelation’
(Sect. 3). I propose a revised version, ‘Phenomenal Revelation,’ which, unlike standard
statements, is compatible with a yet unstated but plausible core belief, ‘Depth.’ Depth
is (roughly) that there are interesting things to be discovered about the nature of the
colors. Finally, I show that ostensivism is the only view on color (including reductive
views and other precise primitivist views) that can accommodate both Phenomenal
Revelation and Depth (Sect. 4) and so is superior in this respect. This argument is not
meant to be conclusive. I have a modest aim: to propose a precise variant of primitivism
and show why it has an advantage over other views on color.
2 What is color ostensivism?
Primitivism is the view that the colors are non-reductive properties in whatever cogent
way or ways shapes are. As will become clear, the view I propose, ostensivism, is
a precise kind of primitivism, but one that is incompatible with other precise kinds
of primitivism. Many formulations of primitivism lack the precision to say for sure
whether ostensivism is incompatible with them, but there are two recent formulations
of primitivism that are, in my opinion, precise enough. The first such precise kind
of primitivism is that all truths about the nature of the colors are ‘chromatic truths’
(Byrne and Hilbert 2007): if a proposition p is about the nature of the colors, then p is
expressible only using a purely chromatic sentence (see Sect. 2.6 for more details). The
second precise kind of primitivism is a view analogous to the view that ‘arithmetical
truths do not need to be explained in terms of anything other than the most basic
truths about numbers: truths we learn when we learn to count out loud and when
we learn to count out how many objects are in a collection’ (Gert 2008, p. 130).
The view goes like this: all fundamental truths about the colors are the kinds of
simple (or easy) things ordinary people know.1 An implication of this is that nothing
informative can be said about what the colors are (as the footnote points out, Gert
wants this implication). I categorize these two recently articulated primitivist views
1 Some disagree about the quietist nature of the view Gert (2008) proposes. Thus, I will here provide some
support for my formulation of his view. Gert holds that his view is that there are no informative or non-trivial
truths about what the colors are (personal correspondence). My formulation of his view captures this. He
also wants the analogy he makes with arithmetical truths to be rather tight (personal correspondence). My
formulation draws a tight analogy between the stated view on arithmetical truths and his view on color.
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as, ‘Primitivism’ (‘Primitivism’ italicized). Primitivism is a kind of color quietism.
This will become clearer later on.
2.1 Ostensivism defined
Ostensivism holds that the colors are chromatic phenomenal properties. I mean some-
thing very precise by this: that the intrinsic natures of the colors are those phenomenal
properties that ostensively define the phenomenal characters of experiences as of
objects having colors. (The intrinsic nature of something can be understood as being
what that thing is most fundamentally. It is what that thing really and ultimately is,
in reality.)2 Thus, ostensivism holds that the intrinsic natures of the colors are the
phenomenal colors or the colors as we see them. These are the properties by which we
define the phenomenal characters of experiences. Consequently, the intrinsic natures
of the colors are not hidden from our immediate experience like those of the physical
sciences: the redness phenomenally presented in experience, appearing to cover the
surface of the tomato, that is the intrinsic nature of red. In other words, according to
ostensivism, the intrinsic natures of the colors are (completely) given by their phenom-
enal characterizations: that they are like that and that… Consider the way a tomato
looks when it looks red; the intrinsic nature of red is given by that way of looking.
Non-ostensivist views deny this. They hold that the intrinsic natures of the colors are
not given by their phenomenal characterizations. For example, physicalist views (as
normally understood) hold that the intrinsic natures of the colors are given by physical
descriptions.
Ostensivism implies some very interesting things about the nature of the colors.
(Things that are merely in the nature of the colors as opposed to being their intrinsic
natures are still fundamental to the colors but less so; they are things that are deter-
mined by the intrinsic natures of the colors.) The intrinsic natures of dispositions are
not (completely) given by phenomenal characterizations; they require descriptions, for
example, ‘the disposition to appear red to normal observers in normal conditions.’ Dis-
positions connect objects with counterfactuals in a special way that non-dispositional
properties (also called ‘categorical properties’) do not. Thus, ostensivism implies that
it is in the nature of the colors that they are categorical properties and so do not have
the special connection with counterfactuals that dispositions do. More specifically,
ostensivism implies that it is in the nature of the colors that they are structural, cate-
gorical properties. A structural property, as I define it, is a property that is defined over
multiple dimensions. The colors, as phenomenal properties, are defined over multiple
dimensions: hue, saturation, and lightness.3
2 The use of ‘intrinsic’ in ‘intrinsic nature’ should not be taken to imply that a property which is not the
intrinsic nature of something must be extrinsic to that thing. The word ‘intrinsic’ in ‘intrinsic nature’ is
different from the sense of the word used in the intrinsic/extrinsic property of objects distinction, at least
the way I am using it. The intrinsic nature of a property might in fact be such that the property is an extrinsic
property of objects.
3 The Munsell color system uses chroma instead of saturation for surface colors. Arguably there are
fundamentally different kinds of color: surface colors, film colors, aperture colors. These are said to differ
in their exact dimensions (Maund 2012). It may be the case that the colors or some colors have additional
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Shapes are structural, categorical properties too. The assumed view of shapes is
that they are categorical (non-dispositional) and, like colors, vary over certain dimen-
sions: number of sides, length of sides, and internal angles. There is another similarity
between shapes and colors if ostensivism is true, a similarity that is important to osten-
sivism being a primitivist view on color. The assumed view of shape is that shapes are
non-reductive properties in the sense that they are not identical with any properties
that are not as we see them (shape properties themselves are as we see them, even
if external world objects do not always have the properties we see them as having).
Ostensivism is non-reductive in the same way.4 The view holds that the colors are
not any properties that are not as we see them. Ostensivism holds that the intrinsic
natures of the colors are the phenomenal colors or the colors as we see them. Thus, in
sum, color ostensivism tells us that the nature of the colors is that they are chromatic
phenomenal properties that are similar in kind to shape properties: both colors and
shapes are non-reducible, structural, categorical properties.
2.2 Some criticisms of the notion ‘phenomenal property’
1. Phenomenal concepts such as those employed above have been shown defective
by Wittgenstein’s private language argument (henceforth, ‘PLA’) (Wittgenstein 1953,
sections 243–293). First, it is important to note that it is not set in stone that phenomenal
concepts are indeed inconsistent with the PLA (Papineau 2011). Putting this aside,
phenomenal concepts are not merely relevant to my theory but to all sorts of arguments
in the philosophy of mind, including Jackson’s famous knowledge argument (1982).
So, I will not address this Wittgensteinian worry with phenomenal concepts in any
depth. A discussion of the PLA and a survey of possible responses to the PLA is
really beyond the scope of this work. Suffice to say, I agree with Papineau (2011) that
Wittgenstein’s PLA, if incompatible, sets the bar for meaning too high. If a reader
desires to learn more, they could start with the cited paper.
2. Phenomenal properties are unexplainably rich. This concern involves most
directly my claim that ‘the colors, as phenomenal properties, are defined over multiple
dimensions: hue, saturation, and lightness.’ In reply, I believe what the ostensivist
should say is that all explanations must come to an end sooner or later, and when it
comes to what explains the richness of phenomenal properties, the end comes sooner
rather than later. The ostensivist cannot accept a reductive account of the structural
properties of the colors. The structural properties of the colors must be determined
by what the colors are most fundamentally (their intrinsic natures), and for the osten-
Footnote 3 continued
or different dimensions. Perhaps there are more dimensions than human eyes can see (Thompson 1995,
pp. 141–160; Allen 2009). These are complications that are not important to the goals of the present paper.
All I need my reader to accept is that the colors are defined over multiple dimensions (not necessarily the
same ones).
4 This analogy should not be confused to imply that shape properties are phenomenal properties (or to imply
that there are physical and phenomenal shapes). If it will aid understanding, one might think in Lockean
terms: the assumed view of shape is that our perceptions of shapes match the nature of shapes. Put this
way, the analogy is that with ostensivism, analogous to the assumed view on shapes, our perceptions match
reality.
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sivist, what they are most fundamentally is given by pointing. So, the ostensivist’s
only explanation for why the colors have the structure they do is to say, ‘what explains
their structure is that they are like this, that, and that’ (pointing). In other words,
what fundamentally explains the structure of the colors is how they look, according to
ostensivism. This is an explanation, but it is a phenomenal, non-reductive explanation.
3. Phenomenal properties function as explanantia by having built in, merely by
stipulation, all the features of the explanandum. This is a related concern to the first.
However, instead of claiming that the richness of phenomenal properties is unexplain-
able, this criticism claims that phenomenal properties can explain the structure of the
colors (and perhaps the other properties in their nature too) only circularly. Here we
must tread carefully. A circular explanation merely builds the answer into the expla-
nation in such a way that it fails to provide any new information; for example, ‘the
colors have a structure, because they have a structure.’ Perhaps a philosopher might
read this answer as asserting a kind of primitivism, but literally, as written, it does not
provide anything new; it is circular. Ostensivism is primitivist, not circular. Suppose
someone were to ask, ‘why is green more similar to yellow than to red?’ The osten-
sivist’s reply is to assert that the answer most fundamentally involves the phenomenal
natures (pointing) of the colors in question. This is not circular, or at least it is not
circular in the sense of providing no new information.
4. Descriptive truths about the colors, e.g. that they have structure, cannot be
determined by non-descriptive, phenomenal facts, i.e. how they look. In reply, I simply
reject this claim. I assert that they can. One need only remove one’s reductivist goggles
to see that this is true. Some descriptions are made true by spatial facts, some are
made true by temporal facts, some are made true by mathematical facts, and some are
made true by phenomenal facts. According to ostensivism, what the colors are most
fundamentally are phenomenal properties. Therefore, according to ostensivism, all
true descriptions about the nature of the colors are determined by phenomenal facts.
This kind of view will not be popular with reductivists. However, it is not an odd or
weird or mysterious idea that what makes it true that, for example, ‘green is more
similar to yellow than to red’ is how these colors look; it is a perfectly intuitive and
ordinary thought.
2.3 Ostensivism and irrealism
My view, ostensivism, is compatible with realism (the view that external objects are
actually colored) and with different kinds of irrealism.5 It looks in perception as if
external objects have phenomenal color properties (look at something), suggesting
5 If ostensivism is compatible with irrealism, does this mean that the view implies that the colors are only
contingently related to underlying micro-physical properties? The sense in which ostensivism is compatible
with irrealism is logical. So, this leaves room for saying that metaphysically, irrealism is impossible. The
ostensivist may wish to adopt this metaphysical stance to avoid sceptical worries. Imagine a twin-earth
exactly like this one except that nothing is colored. Twin-earth would look colored but not be. I think there
is no need to reject what I consider to be the intuitive position that colors are only contingently related to
underlying micro-physical properties, because really the sceptical concern in question is just an instance
of scepticism about the external world (for some related discussion regarding quiddistic knowledge, see
Schaffer 2005).
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that realism is the default position based on how things look. This said, nothing in
the formulation of ostensivism logically requires the phenomenal properties identified
with the colors to be had by external objects rather than internal ones (e.g. sense data,
see Jackson 1977) or by any objects whatsoever (Chalmers 2006). Ostensivism does
not imply that how objects look with respect to colors is how they are; it only implies
that the colors, as properties, are as they look. If the phenomenal properties are had
by internal objects, we can be understood as pointing at them; if they are not had
by any objects, we can be understood as pointing at merely possible color properties
(not actually instantiated). What is necessary for this to work is that for what we are
pointing at not to be determined purely internally. We can think we are pointing at
something actually in front of us but really be pointing at something in our minds or
in purely logical space. Given the popularity of externalist views of content (Putnam
1975), this externalist perspective on ostensive definitions cannot be assumed false.6
Whether realism or some variant of irrealism is correct is not something I will
discuss. The purpose of this article is to propose a precise version of primitivism and
show why it has an advantage over other views on color; it is not to argue that realism
or irrealism is true. If ostensivism ultimately meant that some form of irrealism were
true, this would be a strike against the view, but it is hard to imagine why ostensivism
would have a worse time accommodating realism than other primitivist views. Worries
about realism are endemic to primitivist views about color in general. This is in part
because of pervasive worries about the causal efficacy of primitive color properties.
These concerns will have to be put aside. Relevant work can be found in Gert (2008,
pp. 143–145). Much of what he says is about Johnston’s core belief Explanation:
the colors causally explain our color experiences. Relevant work can also be found
in Byrne and Hilbert (2007, pp. 82–85). All three of these philosophers argue that
primitive colors can play the causal role required, and what they say can be applied to
ostensivism.7 For further reading see Allen (2016, Chapter 5).
2.4 Ostensivism and relationalism
Is ostensivism compatible with Cohen’s relational view (2004, 2009)? It seems not. His
view holds that the intrinsic natures of the colors are given by relational descriptions of
them.8 This said, ostensivism has the potential to be compatible with the colors being
relational properties, more generally conceived. To understand why, I must explain
an important distinction between the intrinsic nature of a property and an essential
property of that property. An example explains this distinction. The property of being
a triangle essentially has the property of being more similar to being rectangular than to
being pentagonal, but the intrinsic nature of the property of being a triangle is not that
it is the property of being more similar to being rectangular than to being pentagonal.
6 See Whiteley (1956) for some discussion of ostensive definitions.
7 Byrne and Hilbert (2007) raise different problems for primitivism: the problem of animal color vision and
the problem of permuted earth. There is no space to discuss these problems in this paper. See Gert (2008),
Brogaard (2009) and Watkins (2010) for relevant discussion in favor of primitivist color realism.
8 I say this because he understands his view to be reductivist (Cohen 2009, p. 10, footnote 16).
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The intrinsic nature of the property of being a triangle is that it is the property of being
a three-sided figure (picture it).
With this distinction in mind, one can see that ostensivism is compatible with the
colors being relational properties. There are positive and impure relational properties
(Khamara 1988). The property of being married is an example of the former. This
property is biconditionally dependent on the relation ‘married to’ such that a person
x is married iff x is married to someone. The property of being married to Tom is
an example of the latter. This property is such that a person x has the property being
married to Tom iff there is an individual Tom and x is married to him. A general
analysis is as follows:
General relational analysis. A property P is relational iff there is some relation
R such that it is essential to P that for all x, if x has P, then for some thing(s)
y1…yn, Rxy1…yn. (Roberts 2014b, p. 1803)
The ostensivist can hold that the colors fit this analysis. The intrinsic nature of being
red is that it is like that (pointing to a red sample), but that property P has as an
essential property being such that it is essential to P that for all x, if x has P, then
for some thing(s) y1…yn, Rxy1…yn. In other words, ostensivism is compatible with
the colors being relational properties, for we can understand this not as saying what
their intrinsic natures are but as merely giving an essential property of them. For
these reasons, ostensivism is compatible with both positive and impure relationalism.
Let me quickly address a potential confusion. One may think that all this shows is
that ostensive colors can have relational properties not that they can be relational
properties. However, to be a relational property, a property just needs to meet the
analysis. A property meets the analysis IFF it has as an essential property the property
of meeting the analysis. Ostensive colors can have this property, in principle. Thus,
ostensive colors can, in principle, be relational properties.
In response, one might argue that the colors do not phenomenally look like relational
properties (McGinn 1996, p. 541; Tye 2000, p. 152). If ostensivism is true, the colors
must phenomenally look like the properties we are accustomed to in visual color
experience. It is unclear, though, whether the cited arguments succeed (Byrne and
Hilbert 2001).9 Thus, if one as an ostensivist were troubled by color variation cases
like Cohen (2004, 2009), it would be worth investigating an ostensivism which holds
that the colors of objects depend on relations to subjects. A subjective ostensivism
is an open possibility for those who like Cohen’s arguments. This is an important
difference between ostensivism and standard primitivist views. Cohen’s arguments
cannot be used to undermine ostensivism.
It is intuitive that nothing can be red and green or teal and scarlet all over at
once. If one feels the force of this exclusion principle, one may find Cohen’s work
unconvincing.10 For these people, an objectivist ostensivism is a live option. They need
9 In my opinion, there is a lot of confusion regarding thinking of dispositions as relational properties. I
argue in Roberts (2014b) that dispositions are not relational properties, and this is the perspective I take
here too.
10 I acknowledge that there is an added complication here that arises due to Cohen’s (2009) fine-
grain/coarse-grain distinction. Coarse-grain colors are supposed to accommodate the exclusion principle
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only accept that external objects can have objective phenomenal properties, which
many primitivists would probably be willing to do. Of course, those who accept the
exclusion principle need not reject all versions of relational ostensivism. For instance,
there is room for an objective, relational ostensivism that respects color exclusion.
What of a view which holds that the colors depend on the color(s) of the surround and
the color(s) of the illuminate and not on minds (Roberts 2017)? Such a view would be
a compromise between subjectivism and standard objectivism. I remain neutral about
whether we should be relational ostensivists.
2.5 Ostensivism and Campbell’s simple view
Is ostensivism compatible with Campbell’s simple view (1993, 2005)? The answer is
that it is inconclusive, because Campbell’s view is not precise enough of a formulation
of primitivism. He never says what precisely the colors are according to his view, but
just provides a series of at least four theses attributing certain properties to the colors.
They are as follows:
Distinctness. The colors are not dispositions or physical properties.11 (1993,
p. 258)
Ground. The colors are the categorical grounds of the dispositions to produce
experiences of color. (1993, p. 258)
Transparency. Experience as of color provides knowledge of the categorical
color property intervention on which changes the experiences of observers.12
(2005, Sect. 2)
Inheritance. The qualitative characters of color experiences are inherited from
the qualitative character of the colors. (1993, p. 268)
Ostensivism endorses Distinctness. Ostensivism neither accepts nor denies Ground.
Ostensivism but not the simple view, for instance, is compatible with the colors super-
vening on dispositions to produce experiences of color (McGinn 1996). Campbell’s
knowledge of the colors relies on a non-propositional knowledge relation distinct
from the more familiar propositional knowledge relation. Ostensivism does not rule
out Transparency but neither does it require it. There is nothing in its formulation
that implies that there is any such thing as a non-propositional knowledge relation.
Whether ostensivism is compatible with Inheritance depends on whether the sense of
Footnote 10 continued
to some degree. Other papers have already engaged with this distinction (e.g. see Roberts, 2014a), and so I
will not do so here.
11 I take the sense of ‘physical’ in Distinctness to be narrow (similar to those properties mentioned by
physics; see the first line of his paper). I do not understand the narrow sense to exclude the colors being
physical more generally. The term ‘physical’ is often a term of art in philosophy and some sense must be
gotten from context. I will not attempt a rigorous definition, as Campbell (1993) gives none.
12 The way I understand Campbell, intervening on the colors changes our experiences, because colors play
a causal role in our experiences. This element of Transparency will not be particularly important to this
paper. This paper does not focus on the debate surrounding the causal efficacy of primitive colors.
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possession in it, signaled by ‘the qualitative character of the colors,’ is that of instan-
tiation or that of identity. According to ostensivism, the colors do not have qualitative
characters; they are qualitative characters (assuming that Campbell means what I do
by ‘qualitative character:’ how they look). As it is unclear how exactly to interpret
Inhereitance, it is inconclusive whether ostensivism is compatible with the simple
view. What is clear is that ostensivism is less strict in certain important ways.
2.6 Ostensivism is not Primitivism
It should have already occurred to the reader that ostensivism seems rather different
from Primitivism. I will now carefully prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it is indeed
different. First, ostensivism is nothing like Byrne and Hilbert’s primitivism (2007,
p. 78).13 It is not the view that if a proposition p is about the nature of the colors, then
p is expressible only using a purely chromatic sentence. A purely chromatic sentence
is one that contains solely topic-neutral and color vocabulary.14 By ‘topic-neutral’
Byrne and Hilbert mean ‘general, not pertaining to a specific topic or subject, like
physics, psychology, ectoplasmology, …’ (personal correspondence). Examples of
purely chromatic sentences are ‘Every shade of orange is reddish,’ ‘Canary yellow is
not a shade of blue,’ ‘Purple is more similar to red than to yellow,’ etc. (2007, p. 78).
Byrne and Hilbert say in their note 11 that the range of sentences can be extended to
include ‘red is a warm color’ and similar.
Dissimilar to Byrne and Hilbert’s primitivism, ostensivism is the view that the colors
are phenomenal, non-reducible, structural, categorical properties, and this is a truth
about the nature of the colors that is not expressible using a purely chromatic sentence
(and certainly expressible without using one, as I just did this). Not even the most
basic statement of ostensivism, ‘the colors are chromatic phenomenal properties,’ is a
purely chromatic sentence. It is nothing like the examples. The terms ‘phenomenal,’
‘non-reducible,’ ‘structural,’ and ‘categorical,’ as defined, all pertain to philosophy.
So, given Byrne and Hilbert’s definition, these terms are not topic-neutral and so
cannot factor into purely chromatic sentences.15 Perhaps, some of the terms are more
topic-neutral than others, but Byrne and Hilbert certainly must accept that at least ‘non-
reducible’ is not topic-neutral. If it were topic-neutral, ‘reducible’ would have to also
be accepted as topic-neutral (see their note 11), but then their primitivism would be
compatible with the colors being reducible and so with the negation of primitivism. So,
13 Byrne and Hilbert do not actually endorse primitivism. In their 2007 paper they are critiquing the view.
However, for the sake of brevity, I will refer to the version they propose as ‘Byrne and Hilbert’s primitivism.’
14 Byrne and Hilbert say, ’Minimal Primitivism [the view that the colors are non-reductive] may be further
explicated by the claim that the colors have no non-chromatic nature, in the following sense: if ‘It is in
the nature of the colors that p’ is true, then ‘p’ is a purely chromatic sentence—a sentence that is (at least)
solely composed of topic neutral and color vocabulary’ (2007, p. 78). To avoid confusion regarding syntax
versus semantics, I modified their definition of non-reductivism slightly in the main text.
15 For some related discussion see Allen (2016, Chapter 7.5). He makes a case that the naïve realist’s
commitment to Distinctness does not commit him to accepting what I later call ‘Propositional Revelation.’
123
Synthese
if Byrne and Hilbert’s primitivism is true, ostensivism is false.16 Byrne and Hilbert’s
primitivism is some kind of quietism but ostensivism is not.
Second, it should be clear that ostensivism is nothing like Gert’s primitivism (2008,
p. 130). It is not the view that all fundamental truths about the colors are the kinds of
simple things ordinary people know. Ostensivism makes no claims to the effect that
the fundamental truths about the colors are all simple things ordinary people know.
Ostensivism is the view that the colors are phenomenal, non-reducible, structural, cat-
egorical properties, and this is a fundamental truth (if true) about the colors that is not
a simple truth ordinary people know but a hard truth most likely do not know. Not even
the most basic statement of ostensivism ‘the colors are chromatic phenomenal prop-
erties’ is a simple truth. The use of ‘are’ in the basic statement has a precise, technical
sense in philosophy, and ‘phenomenal’ is a difficult concept even for philosophers to
get their minds around, much less ordinary people.
Simple truths, if the idea is to capture Gert’s wanted implication that nothing infor-
mative can be said about what the colors are (there are no non-trivial truths about
what they are), must strike people without years of training as true and do not require
technical concepts to understand. One might retort that if ostensivism is true, the col-
ors are in some sense simple properties. Note that ostensivism does not imply that
the colors are simple properties compared to complex (or composed) properties. The
view is compatible with binary colors (e.g. orange) being non-reductively composed
of unitary colors (red and yellow). Regardless, clearly ostensivism is not the view that
there is nothing informative to be said about what the colors are, and this is what is
relevant. If ostensivism were not informative (if it were just a trivial truth), the position
would not be contentious, but it is. Hence, to learn that ostensivism is correct would
be to learn something informative. Thus, we can state definitively that if Gert’s view
is true, ostensivism is false. Gert’s primitivism is clearly a kind of quietism but, as I
said, ostensivism is not quietist.17
16 This cannot be avoided by holding that Byrne and Hilbert mean something special by ‘nature.’ This is
not plausible, given that the following is their exposition of the concept: ‘If colors are ways of altering light,
for instance, then a description of the nature of canary yellow would certainly need to specify in canonical
physical terms the exact way of altering light that is identical to canary yellow. And the fact (if it is one) that
canary yellow is more similar to ochre than it is to teal is again something that a description of its nature
needs to mention. On the other hand, any defensible description of the nature of canary yellow will omit
the fact that some Post-it notes are canary yellow, the fact that canary yellow is Johnston’s favorite example
of a color, and even the necessary fact that canary yellow is Johnston’s actual favorite example of a color’
(2007, p. 76).
17 The astute reader may question my categorizing Byrne and Hilbert and Gert’s views as kinds of prim-
itivism, given that both views seem to be incompatible with saying that the colors are by their nature or
fundamentally non-reducible. One should notice that I defined primitivism thus: ‘Primitivism is the view
that the colors are non-reductive properties in whatever cogent way or ways shapes are.’ Primitivism does
not assert that it is in the nature of or fundamental to the colors that they are non-reducible, but it can say,
for instance, that shapes and colors are non-reducible in the following sense: nothing much can be said
about what they are. Note that I disagree with such a quietist take on shape properties, just as I do for color
properties.
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3 Revelation
This section can most generally be seen as examining the core belief Revelation.
Before getting to the meat of this section, I must speak briefly of what I mean by ‘core
belief.’ I define ‘core belief’ to mean ‘intuitive proposition.’ What does this mean? It
is not important for this article to provide an analysis, but my position is that it means
this at minimum: if people had the relevant concepts explained where necessary, they
would find a core belief intuitive. This leaves it definitionally open as to whether core
beliefs need actually be widely believed, which I think is the right result. Revelation,
for example, is not plausibly held by the general population, being too technical.
However, this does not mean that it is not intuitive in the relevant sense and so worth
considering. Of course, just because a proposition is intuitive does not mean that it is,
in fact, true, or that it cannot be rejected. It might be that our intuitions are misguided
at times. So, my argument in this paper that ostensivism has an advantage in being
able to accommodate my proposed core beliefs is just one piece of a larger puzzle. I
will not examine all the pieces of the puzzle in this paper.
3.1 Propositional revelation and depth
Revelation is a core belief that goes back to Russell (1912) and Strawson (1989). The
idea is often associated with primitivism (McGinn 1996; Chalmers 2006; Byrne and
Hilbert 2007: Gert 2008). Johnston (1992, pp. 222–223) famously states Revelation
thus: ‘The intrinsic nature of [for example] canary yellow is fully revealed by a standard
visual experience as of a canary yellow thing.’ It is unclear what Revelation thus stated
amounts to. A natural reading of ‘revealed’ is propositional (Byrne and Hilbert 2007).
It is like seeing that or appearing that. Hence, a well-known interpretation of Revelation
is as follows18:
Propositional revelation (PR). It appears that p after careful reflection on our
experiences as of the colors where p is about the nature of the colors iff p is true.
PR is the conjunction of the following two theses:
Infallibility. If it appears that p after careful reflection on our experiences as of
the colors where p is about the nature of the colors, then p is true.
Self -Intimation. If a proposition p is about the nature of the colors and p is true,
then it appears that p after careful reflection on our experiences as of the colors.
It is somewhat plausible that Infallibility is a core belief, because theories that are
unable to accommodate what appears to be true about the nature of the colors after
careful reflection (on our experiences as of the colors) are often taken to be false (Hardin
1988; Boghossian and Velleman 1991; Johnston 1992). However, Self-Intimation can-
not be a component of a core belief about color, because, ironically, it contradicts a
18 Indeed, this is (basically) Johnston’s understanding of Revelation given his clarification on p. 225 as
follows: ‘The nature of canary yellow is supposed to be fully revealed by visual experience so that once
one has seen canary yellow there is no more to know about the way canary yellow is.’
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core belief about color, just not one that has yet been mentioned as such. Roughly, the
core belief in question is that the colors are properties about which interesting things
can be discovered. It runs as follows:
Depth. The colors are properties the nature of which deep and interesting things
can be discovered via philosophical and scientific investigation.
If Self-Intimation were true, all truths about the nature of the colors would be revealed
to be true upon careful reflection on experience. So, nothing deep and interesting about
the nature of the colors would be left to be discovered via philosophical and scientific
investigation. Thus, PR cannot be a core belief about color if Depth is. Depth is a core
belief. So, PR is not.
Why should we believe that Depth is a core belief? The binary/unitary distinction,
although orthodoxy today, was once (and still is to a degree, Mizrahi 2009; Jameson
2010) the subject of philosophical and scientific scrutiny (Allen 2011, 2016, Chap-
ter 7.4). Given that this investigation into the nature of the colors took place, those who
took part probably thought that the colors were properties about which, intuitively, such
an investigation could be fruitful. Further, the fact that philosophers have for centuries
been trying to determine what the colors are (that the ontology of color exists as an
area of enquiry) suggests that they found it intuitive that the colors were the kinds of
properties suitable for such an enquiry. In sum, the decades old investigation into the
nature of the colors by both philosophers and scientists suggests that Depth is a core
belief, for were it not, the investigation would probably not have occurred. Although
more discussion of Depth is called for, I leave the debate here for the present paper.
The proposition is intuitive enough to plausibly be called a ‘core belief,’ and the vast
majority of philosophers will probably accept that it is true regardless. Besides, given
my understanding of ‘core belief,’ I think whether Depth is a core belief is ultimately
an empirical question and so is best addressed by an empirical paper.
Gert (2008, p. 142) proposes an alternative account of Revelation he calls ‘Modest
Revelation,’ which is supposed to be a weaker version. It runs as follows:
Modest revelation (MR). A complete understanding of what canary yellow is
can be given by an experience as of something canary yellow, in someone with
normal human vision who has already acquired color concepts.
MR seems to imply modest self-intimation (or something close enough to be similarly
problematic): if a proposition p is about the nature of the colors and p is true, then
it appears that p to someone with normal human vision who has already acquired
color concepts. If so, MR like PR is incompatible with Depth (or something similar
enough to be worrying).19 Given the nature of Gert’s primitivism this is not particularly
surprising. Anyway, at best, MR is not abundantly clear and under a natural interpre-
19 Kalderon (2007, p. 587) proposes what he calls ‘Manifestation’ (M). The view seems to be as follows: the
qualitative nature of the colors (which have to do with the structure of color space, e.g. claims involving Unity
and the similarity, difference, and exclusions relations) are revealed in experiences of normal observers.
M would be incompatible with Depth if we thought Depth extended to the Unity relations (Allen 2016,
Chapter 7). If there are colors we cannot see, it would. Anyway, M is too weak to be a version of Revelation
proper.
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tation implies modest self-intimation. This is reason enough to find MR wanting and
to struggle to do better.
3.2 Phenomenal revelation
In this paper, I advance the idea that Revelation should be understood phenomenally.
The idea is that when we have an experience as of canary yellow it is not that it appears
that the intrinsic nature of canary yellow is whatever it is but that its intrinsic nature
is phenomenally presented.20 This should not be understood to be propositional in the
same way as ‘appearing that’ is normally understood in that it should not be understood
to be cognitive and involve thought, and preferably it should not be understood as
propositional at all (Crane 2009). To be clear, the idea is not that it appears that the
intrinsic nature of canary yellow is whatever it is in the way that it appears that the
answer to 2 + 24. The idea is that when we have experiences as of canary yellow,
the very entity that is the intrinsic nature of canary yellow is phenomenally presented,
and that this can be the case without any propositions appearing true before or after
careful reflection. Revelation so interpreted runs as follows:
Phenomenal revelation (PHR). The phenomenal properties that define the phe-
nomenal characters of experiences as of objects having colors are the intrinsic
natures of the colors. (In other words, the phenomenal colors or the colors as we
see them in perception are the intrinsic natures of the colors.)
PHR is close to the surface in Johnston’s Revelation and captures an important ele-
ment of naïve realism: that our color experience puts us into direct contact with color
properties as they really are, intrinsically. Hence, it has a strong claim to being a core
belief. When we have an experience as of an object being canary yellow, that phe-
nomenal quality presented, given as covering the object, is the very entity that is the
intrinsic nature of canary yellow. According to PHR, then, there is no entity that is
identical with what canary yellow really is (its intrinsic nature) with which our experi-
ence merely indirectly presents us as if it were an indicator of a reality hidden behind
a phenomenal veil. Rather, because PHR holds that the phenomenal properties that
define our phenomenal characters are the intrinsic natures of the colors, PHR lifts the
phenomenal veil and allows for the seeing of colors as they really are. Also, impor-
tantly, PHR is compatible with Depth. PHR does not require that anything which is
true of the colors appear true in cognition or thought or in any way whatsoever. So,
PHR is very plausibly a core belief. It is close to the surface in Johnston’s statement,
captures an important element of naïve realism, and is compatible with Depth.
20 I caution the reader from reading ‘phenomenally presented’ so as to imply being presented in any sense
used for ordinary objects. I phenomenally experience the circular object as being square. So, squareness
is phenomenally presented, but nowhere around. How precisely to understand phenomenal experience is
a topic best left for a paper on perception (see, for example, Byrne and Logue 2008). Suffice to say, I
would prefer to hold that phenomenal presentation is a fundamental perceptual notion that is involved in
both good and bad cases of perception. Disjunctivism about phenomenal character may raise some issues
with ostensivism being compatible with irrealism. If there are no colors, and one is a (relevant kind of)
disjunctivist about phenomenal character, we have no phenomenal color experiences.
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PHR strikes me as highly intuitive. I suspect it is the truth behind why the various
statements of Revelation have sounded plausible. Given my understanding of ‘core
belief,’ I think that, just as with Depth, whether PHR is a core belief is ultimately an
empirical question. Perhaps an experimental philosophy program could test whether
people agree with PHR over its competitors. Because of the complexity of these
propositions, it may be hard to get non-philosophers to understand the differences.
Perhaps what could be done, though, would be to explain to participants what the
relevant terms mean, give them time to think, and then see which Revelation they
prefer. Alternatively, perhaps simpler statements can be used which still mostly capture
the ideas in question. If participants prefer PHR this would be a reason to suspect that
it is a better candidate for a core belief than its competitors. Of course, intuitions can
misfire. I am not saying that any such study would show PHR to be unassailable; it
would just go a long way to demonstrating the proposition’s intuitiveness.
3.3 Phenomenal revelation versus transparency
PHR has an affinity with knowledge by acquaintance views of Revelation like Camp-
bell’s Transparency (T) (see Sect. 2.5 above). PHR is different from T in two salient and
important ways. First, PHR unlike T does not require any non-propositional knowl-
edge relation. It at most requires a non-epistemic acquaintance relation (the converse
of presentation).21 Second, PHR unlike T speaks of the intrinsic natures of the colors.
Specifically, PHR is logically incompatible with the colors being, for example, low-
level physical properties, while T is not (this is uncontroversial: Campbell thinks T is
problematic for such views but not that it is logically incompatible with them 2005,
Sect. 2). So, T unlike PHR does not require that the colors are, intrinsically, as we see
them to be.
If we had to choose between PHR and T as being the correct way of capturing
Revelation, the differences between them would give us reason to prefer PHR. First,
PHR does not require a non-epistemic knowledge relation. Some find such a relation
mysterious (Fumerton 2014). Belief is propositional and thought required for knowl-
edge, so how can there be non-propositional knowledge? Second, presumably animals
without the cognitive sophistication to know of things (e.g. a fish of sorts or a spider
or a bug perhaps) could still see colors the way we do as long as they had (stable?)
experiences with the same phenomenal characters, but T would not be true for such
animals. Hence, T presumably cannot capture the idea attributed to Strawson (1989)
that Revelation is necessarily true of color experience (Johnson 1992, p. 224). PHR
though can. In this way, PHR is more fundamental than T and so, in this way, superior.
Third, that PHR requires that we see color properties as they really are, intrinsically, is
also an advantage, because this allows PHR to capture an important element of naïve
realism. Regardless, there is no need to choose between PHR and T. Revelation is an
amorphous notion. Therefore, both ideas can be present to some degree in it, and as I
21 Fumerton (2014) provides a good discussion of the issues with understanding an epistemic acquaintance
relation. He speculates that the idea may be due to Russell equivocating between the relation of acquaintance
and a special kind of knowledge of truth whose sole source is acquaintance.
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said in Sect. 2.5, ostensivism is compatible with T. Thus, all I need is for PHR to be a
core belief about color. PHR and T do not have to be enemies.
4 The advantages of ostensivism
So far, I have defined ostensivism and differentiated it from other views and have
discussed Revelation in detail and made a case for Depth and Phenomenal Revela-
tion (PHR). Now, in this final major section, I will show that only ostensivism can
accommodate both Depth and PHR. I compare ostensivism to non-ostensivist views:
reductive views and Primitivism. As most of what is required to complete this section
has been previously set up, what follows should be easy to understand, and so I will
not spend much time making my argument.
4.1 Compatibility with phenomenal revelation
PHR is that the phenomenal properties that define the phenomenal characters of expe-
riences as of objects having colors are the intrinsic natures of the colors. The ostensivist
answers the metaphysical question, ‘what are the colors?’ by saying that the intrin-
sic natures of the colors are those phenomenal properties that define the phenomenal
characters of experiences as of objects having colors. Thus, clearly, ostensivism is true
iff PHR is true, and so ostensivism can clearly accommodate PHR and, in fact, even
do so necessarily. The fact that ostensivism and PHR have a bi-conditional logical
relationship is not a strange result. In fact, it is exactly what a primitivist might have
expected, as Revelation and primitivism are thought to be closely related (Strawson
1989; Johnston 1992; Byrne and Hilbert 2007). Thus, I see ostensivism’s connection
with PHR, which is by design, to be as it should be.
Reflectance dispositionalism, micro-structuralism, appearance dispositionalism,
and Cohen’s view must all deny that the phenomenal properties that define the phenom-
enal characters of experiences as of objects having colors are the intrinsic natures of
the colors. All of these views are non-ostensivist. They hold that the intrinsic natures of
the colors are not given by their phenomenal characterizations but by something else.22
For example, reflectance dispositionalism says that the intrinsic nature of redness is
given by the description, ‘redness is the disposition to reflect a particular proportion of
incident light at each wavelength of the visible spectrum.’ Thus, with respect to PHR,
ostensivism can accommodate this core belief, whereas the relevant non-ostensivist
views cannot.
Can Primitivism accommodate PHR? Byrne and Hilbert’s precise version of prim-
itivism is that if a proposition p is about the nature of the colors, then p is expressible
only using a purely chromatic sentence. So, this version cannot accommodate PHR.
This core belief implies ostensivism, and this view on the nature of color, as I have
22 Johnston (1992) says that appearance dispositionalism is compatible with a grain of truth in Revela-
tion. I do not take issue with this. However, this grain of truth is insufficient to accommodate Phenomenal
Revelation. Phenomenal Revelation implies ostensivism, an entirely different view from appearance dispo-
sitionalism.
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already discussed, is clearly not expressible (only) using a purely chromatic sentence.
Gert’s precise version of primitivism is the view that all fundamental truths about the
colors are simple truths ordinary people know. So, Gert’s primitivism cannot accom-
modate PHR either. PHR implies that ostensivism is true, a fundamental truth about
the colors that, as I have argued, is not a simple truth ordinary people know but a
hard truth most likely do not know. Thus, we can conclude that, although ostensivism
clearly accommodates PHR, Primitivism cannot.
4.2 Compatibility with depth
We come finally to considering Depth: The colors are properties the nature of which
deep and interesting things can be discovered via philosophical and scientific investiga-
tion. All non-primitivist views can clearly accommodate this core belief. For example,
reflectance dispositionalism tells us (if true) something interesting about the nature
of the colors via philosophical and scientific investigation. The same goes for the
other non-primitivist views like micro-structuralism and even Cohen’s relational view.
Ostensivism can also clearly accommodate Depth. Ostensivism tells us that the col-
ors are phenomenal properties, which are non-reducible, structural, and categorical
like shapes, and surely this would be an interesting discovery about the nature of the
colors via philosophical investigation, an investigation that, as should be clear, is not
oblivious to the findings of science.
Unlike ostensivism, Primitivism cannot accommodate Depth. Byrne and Hilbert’s
primitivism is in trouble when it comes to Depth, for it implies that there are no
truths about the nature of the colors but those only expressible using purely chro-
matic sentences. So, Byrne and Hilbert’s primitivism is at most compatible with a
much-weakened version of Depth that is written to exclude truths expressible in non-
chromatic sentences. Gert’s primitivism also has a serious problem. His view is that
all fundamental truths about the colors are simple truths ordinary people know. So,
according to his view, there can be no fundamental truths about the nature of the colors
to be discovered via philosophical and scientific investigation. So, Gert’s primitivism
is at most compatible with a much-weakened version of Depth written to exclude
fundamental truths (e.g. truths about what the colors are).23 In sum, ostensivism can
accept Depth, Primitivism at best only a much-weakened version.
5 Conclusion
My goal for this paper has been modest: to propose a precise variant of primitivism,
‘ostensivism,’ and show why it has an advantage over other views on color, specifically,
that only it can accommodate both Phenomenal Revelation and Depth. Ultimately,
whether this is an advantage depends on whether Phenomenal Revelation and Depth
are really core beliefs. If one does not believe whatsoever that Revelation is a core
belief, one will not be convinced by the reasons I gave for accepting Phenomenal
23 Gert could include some (but not all) truths about the nature of the colors by setting a certain level of
fundamentality for what counts as ‘fundamental’ in my statement of his view.
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Revelation. Similarly, those who hold firmly to a view like Byrne and Hilbert’s or Gert’s
will likely not find what I say in favor of Depth convincing and so neither Phenomenal
Revelation. I ask only that out of humility such staunch opposition consider this paper
as showing why ostensivism might have an advantage over other views in being able
to accommodate both the propositions in question.
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